Since it was presented in 1963, Chisholm's paradox has attracted constant attention in the deontic logic literature, but without the emergence of any definitive solution. We claim this is due to its having no single solution. The paradox actually presents many challenges to the formalization of deontic statements, including (1) context sensitivity of unconditional oughts, (2) formalizing conditional oughts, and (3) distinguishing generic from nongeneric oughts. Using the practical interpretation of 'ought' as a guideline, we propose a linguistically motivated logical solution to each of these problems, and explain the relation of the solution to the problem of contrary-to-duty obligations.
1 Chisholm's Paradox [1] formulates the problem of contrary-to-duty obligations with the following example. Although the language in (1a) and (1b) is somewhat stilted and unnatural, there is nothing uncommon about the situation it describes. Frequently a secondary obligation results from the violation of a primary obligation. This is only considered to be paradoxical because such examples are difficult to formalize.
We begin with an unconditional version of the Chisholm quartet. Having shed some complication, we argue, it becomes clear that 'oughts' are context-sensitive. Bearing that in mind, we shift to conditional obligation in Section 5. There, we offer considerations in favor of factual, rather than deontic, detachment. In Section 5.3, we show that a narrow-scope deontic conditional is unsuitable for the formalization of reparational obligations unless the conditional is contextualized. This contextualization avoids the problematic inference. We then discuss how generic constructions may be used to recover deontic detachment for wide-scope conditional 'ought's where necessary. Finally, we return to Chisholm's paradox in Section 6, where we demonstrate our proposed solution.
Steps (1b) (2d) follows from (2a) and (2c) in standard deontic logics. But, although (2a-c) appear to be mutually consistent and provide a plausible description of the Chisholm scenario, (2d) is clearly false.
We don't deny that the conditional version of Chisholm's paradox illustrates logical difficulties having to do with conditional obligation. But the unconditional version reveals a more fundamental problem that needs to be cleared up before turning to the conditional case.
A Methodology
Work in deontic logic tends to concentrate on examples with moral overtones, like promise-keeping. But 'ought' has many uses. If we assume, with [6] , that these uses differ only in the sort of possibilities that are in play, these differences will not affect the underlying logic. Practical or prudential uses of 'ought' provide intuitions that in general are crisper than moral uses, and moreover are readily restricted to simple domains or scenarios.
We propose to use a game that we'll call Heads Up as a laboratory for testing deontic intuitions. A number of playing cards are set down side by side. A player, Jones, gets to choose a card. The player's payoffs are dependent on whether he chooses a face card. Simple versions of this game will involve just one choice, while more complicated versions will involve successive choices.
